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It	  can	  be	  easy	  to	  assume	  that	  since	  the	  ‘theist	  in	  the	  street’	  is	  unaware	  of	  any	  of	  the	  traditional	  
arguments	  for	  theism	  he	  or	  she	  is	  not	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  
believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  I	  argue	  that	  that	  is	  false	  if	  we	  accept	  with	  William	  Alston	  (1991)	  that	  
‘manifestation	  beliefs’	  can	  enjoy	  rational	  support	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  suitable	  religious	  
experiences.	  I	  make	  my	  case	  by	  defending	  the	  viability	  of	  a	  ‘Moorean’-­‐style	  proof	  for	  theism—
a	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  that	  parallels	  in	  structure	  G.E.	  Moore’s	  famous	  proof	  for	  the	  
existence	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  shows	  that	  even	  if	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  has	  
nothing	  to	  offer	  for	  helping	  to	  convince	  the	  religious	  sceptic,	  this	  needn’t	  entail	  that	  she	  
cannot	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  in	  defense	  of	  her	  theistic	  belief.	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I.	  Introduction	  
	  
It	  is	  easy	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  ‘theist	  in	  the	  street’	  is	  unable	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  
support	  in	  defense	  of	  their	  theistic	  belief;	  and	  so	  cannot,	  on	  that	  account,	  be	  in	  possession	  of	  
rationally	  grounded	  knowledge	  that	  God	  exists.1	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  different	  for	  the	  theist	  who	  is	  in	  
possession	  of	  some	  dialectically	  effective	  argument—like	  one	  of	  the	  traditional	  theistic	  
arguments—for	  thinking	  that	  God	  exists.	  But	  the	  theist	  in	  street	  is	  stipulated	  to	  be	  unfamiliar	  
with	  any	  such	  argument.	  Of	  course	  the	  assumption	  here	  is	  that	  without	  good	  arguments	  the	  
theist	  in	  the	  street	  has	  nothing	  to	  appeal	  to	  for	  offering	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  
believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  Here	  is	  Duncan	  Pritchard,	  for	  example,	  giving	  expression	  to	  this	  
sentiment:	  
	  
“For	  notice	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  what	  specifically	  rational	  support	  is	  available	  to	  the	  [theist	  in	  
the	  street]	  to	  justify	  the	  foundational	  status	  of	  [their]	  belief.	  In	  particular,	  the	  kind	  of	  rational	  
support	  that	  would	  immediately	  leap	  to	  mind—e.g.,	  personal	  religious	  experience,	  testimony	  
from	  peers	  in	  one’s	  religious	  community,	  the	  evidence	  of	  scripture,	  and	  so	  on—would	  not	  be	  
apt	  to	  the	  task	  since	  it	  already	  presupposes	  that	  one’s	  belief	  in	  God’s	  existence	  is	  rationally	  
held.”	  (2012,	  p.	  145;	  emphasis	  added).2	  
	  	  	  
	   Of	  course	  reformed	  epistemologists	  will	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  nothing	  to	  worry	  about.	  
For	  even	  if	  theistic	  belief	  is	  not	  ordinarily	  rationally	  grounded	  in	  the	  operative	  sense,	  it	  may	  
still	  enjoy	  epistemic	  support	  sufficient	  for	  knowledge	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  being	  
produced/sustained	  by	  suitable	  proper	  functioning	  cognitive	  faculties	  (cf.	  Plantinga	  2000),	  
for	  example,	  if	  not	  (also)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  good	  evidence	  (cf.	  Dougherty	  and	  Tweedt	  2015,	  
Tucker	  2011).	  We	  are	  encouraged	  to	  relax:	  folk	  in	  the	  street	  can	  still	  know	  that	  God	  exists	  
even	  if	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  what	  they	  do.	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Note	  that	  we	  need	  not	  deny	  that	  there	  are	  other	  weaker	  notions	  of	  what	  ‘rationally	  grounded’	  knowledge	  2	  Pritchard	  continues:	  “For	  example,	  it	  would	  be	  odd	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  evidence	  of	  scripture	  in	  order	  to	  rationally	  
defend	  one’s	  belief	  in	  God,	  since	  it	  is	  only	  because	  one	  believes	  in	  God	  that	  one	  thinks	  that	  scripture	  has	  the	  
evidential	  bearing	  with	  regard	  to	  religious	  belief	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  One	  is	  thus	  already	  taking	  it	  as	  given	  that	  
one’s	  belief	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  enjoys	  appropriate	  rational	  support.”	  Compare	  also	  this	  quote	  from	  Nicholas	  
Wolterstorff,	  wherein	  he	  describes	  ‘reformed	  epistemology’:	  “Using	  ‘rational’	  as	  a	  catch-­‐all	  word	  for	  the	  various	  
truth-­‐relevant	  doxastic	  merits	  one	  could	  say	  this:	  religious	  beliefs	  can	  be	  rational	  without	  being	  rationally	  
grounded.”	  (2010,	  p.	  29).	  Again,	  the	  implication	  here	  is	  that	  one	  line	  of	  motivation	  for	  reformed	  epistemology	  is	  
that	  theistic	  belief	  is	  not	  ordinarily	  rationally	  grounded	  in	  any	  robust	  sense	  (see	  also	  Dougherty	  and	  Tweedt	  
2015).	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  aim	  to	  say	  otherwise.	  	  	  	  
don’t	  mean	  to	  quarrel	  with	  any	  of	  this.	  But	  even	  still	  I	  think	  this	  grossly	  underestimates	  the	  
theist	  in	  the	  street’s	  epistemic	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  theistic	  belief.	  	  
	   In	  this	  paper	  I	  would	  like	  to	  motivate	  a	  position	  in	  religious	  epistemology	  that	  I	  have	  
not	  seen	  motivated	  before.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  even	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  is	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists—that	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  
one	  cannot	  do	  this	  unless	  one	  can	  offer	  some	  effective	  argument,	  like	  one	  of	  the	  traditional	  
theistic	  arguments,	  for	  thinking	  that	  God	  exists.	  I	  will	  try	  to	  convince	  the	  reader	  of	  this	  with	  
reference	  to	  what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God:	  what	  I	  will	  argue	  
represents	  a	  perfectly	  cogent	  (if	  dialectically	  ineffective)	  proof	  for	  theism	  proceeding	  from	  
premises	  that	  are	  rationally	  supported	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  religious	  experiences.	  An	  important	  
upshot	  is	  that	  both	  philosophers	  of	  God	  and	  perceivers	  of	  God	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  enjoy	  
knowledge	  that	  God	  exists	  that	  is	  rationally	  grounded	  in	  the	  operative	  sense.	  	  
	   Here	  is	  the	  plan.	  In	  §1-­‐2	  I	  build	  on	  ideas	  from	  William	  Alston	  (1991)	  in	  order	  to	  
introduce	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  theism—a	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  that	  parallels	  in	  
structure	  G.E.	  Moore’s	  famous	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  In	  §3	  I	  clarify	  
what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  say	  that	  this	  proof	  can	  confer	  independent	  rational	  support	  upon	  theistic	  
belief—or	  equivalently—can	  represent	  a	  cogent	  proof.	  Then	  in	  §4-­‐5	  I	  defend	  this	  claim	  
against	  attack.	  Specifically,	  I	  look	  to	  the	  literature	  that	  has	  developed	  around	  the	  familiar	  
conservatism	  vs.	  liberalism	  debate	  in	  epistemology	  to	  construct	  two	  objections	  to	  my	  
proposal	  that	  I	  suspect	  most	  readily	  spring	  to	  mind.	  We	  will	  find	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  
objections	  is	  clearly	  successful.	  Finally	  in	  §6-­‐8	  I	  anticipate	  and	  respond	  to	  what	  may	  be	  some	  
of	  the	  readers	  further	  concerns	  regarding	  my	  positive	  proposal.	  Here	  I	  relate	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  
proof	  for	  God	  to	  the	  more	  familiar	  argument	  from	  religious	  experience,	  consider	  whether	  we	  
should	  think	  that	  there	  are	  cogent	  proofs	  for	  God	  rooted	  in	  rational	  support	  for	  claims	  found	  
in	  Scripture,	  and	  then	  finally	  offer	  some	  brief	  remarks	  in	  connection	  with	  reformed	  
epistemology.	  Here	  I	  also	  say	  something	  about	  the	  significance	  my	  conclusion.	  I	  then	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II.	  Alston	  and	  Religious	  Perception	  
	  
Begin	  by	  considering	  Bill.	  Let’s	  say	  that	  Bill	  fits	  the	  description	  of	  our	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  who,	  
recall,	  while	  religiously	  devout	  is	  entirely	  unfamiliar	  with	  any	  of	  the	  traditional	  arguments	  for	  
God’s	  existence.	  Now	  imagine	  that	  Bill	  has	  just	  been	  denied	  an	  absolutely	  crucial	  job	  
opportunity	  despite	  being	  given	  every	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  it	  would	  be	  offered	  to	  him.	  It	  
would	  not	  be	  unusual,	  under	  these	  circumstances,	  for	  someone	  like	  Bill	  to	  enjoy	  a	  conscious	  
mental	  condition	  that—if	  asked—he	  might	  describe	  as	  an	  experience	  as	  of	  God’s	  helping	  him	  
to	  take	  courage	  and	  to	  trust	  Him	  for	  his	  provision	  into	  the	  future.	  
	   Famously	  William	  Alston	  (1991)	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  not	  to	  think	  that	  
in	  cases	  like	  this	  Bill	  might	  enjoy	  rational	  support	  (or	  ‘justification’	  in	  Alston’s	  terms)	  for	  
believing	  something	  like	  ‘God	  is	  encouraging	  me’	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  religious	  experience—or	  
else	  no	  good	  reason	  that	  would	  not	  likewise	  count	  against	  the	  thought	  that	  visual	  experiences	  
can	  provide	  rational	  support	  for	  ordinary	  visual	  perceptual	  beliefs.	  Alston	  thought	  that	  
religious	  experiences	  often	  serve	  to	  mediate	  religious	  (or	  ‘mystical’)	  perceptions	  of	  God,	  and	  
can	  even	  serve	  to	  rationally	  support	  (and	  even	  warrant)	  beliefs	  about	  God’s	  manifesting	  
himself	  to	  an	  individual	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  
	   The	  religious	  beliefs	  at	  issue	  here	  Alston	  calls	  ‘manifestation’	  beliefs	  (or	  M-­‐beliefs	  for	  
short).	  These	  Alston	  writes	  “are	  a	  particular	  species	  of	  perceptual	  beliefs;	  they	  are	  beliefs,	  
based	  on	  mystical	  perception,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  God	  has	  some	  perceivable	  property	  or	  is	  
engaging	  in	  some	  perceivable	  activity”	  (1991,	  p.	  77).	  Plausibly	  paradigmatic	  M-­‐beliefs	  concern	  
God’s	  activity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  particular	  subject	  at	  a	  time:	  for	  example	  beliefs	  about	  God’s	  
admonishing	  one	  for	  some	  wrongdoing;	  strengthening	  one	  through	  some	  adversity;	  or	  
demonstrating	  His	  love	  toward	  one	  in	  some	  tangible	  way.	  	  
	   In	  his	  book	  Perceiving	  God	  Alston	  argues	  that	  these	  M-­‐beliefs	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  
perfectly	  viable	  ‘doxastic	  practice’	  in	  which	  religious	  experiences	  are	  properly	  taken	  at	  face	  
value	  to	  indicate	  what	  they	  purport	  to	  indicate	  to	  a	  given	  subject.	  On	  Alston’s	  picture	  these	  
M-­‐beliefs	  enjoy	  a	  distinctively	  religious	  perceptual	  rational	  support	  (or	  justification)	  when	  
sustained	  in	  light	  of	  suitable	  religious	  experiences—even	  affording	  one	  perceptual	  knowledge	  
of	  M-­‐beliefs	  when	  conditions	  are	  right	  (i.e.	  in	  conditions	  where	  God	  exists	  and	  has	  
orchestrated	  things	  such	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  in	  sufficiently	  reliable	  contact	  with	  Him	  via	  
‘mystical’	  or	  religious	  perceptual	  experience,	  and	  etc.).	  Alston	  is	  at	  great	  pains	  to	  show	  in	  his	  
book	  that	  these	  doxastic	  practises	  are	  on	  all	  fours	  with	  more	  run-­‐of-­‐the-­‐mill	  visual	  perceptual	  
doxastic	  practices.	  
	   For	  our	  purposes	  we	  needn’t	  become	  embroiled	  in	  the	  finer	  details	  of	  Alston’s	  
proposal.	  What	  I	  have	  represented	  here	  is	  sufficient	  for	  what	  we	  need:	  viz.,	  a	  perfectly	  
coherent	  account	  of	  how,	  in	  worlds	  where	  God	  exists	  and	  is	  concerned	  to	  manifest	  Himself	  to	  
His	  creation	  in	  perceivable	  ways,	  one	  could	  come	  to	  know	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  religious	  experience.	  Here	  I	  will	  be	  taking	  for	  granted	  Alston’s	  account	  
of	  religious-­‐based	  perceptual	  warrants	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  one	  can	  enjoy	  
rational	  support	  for	  M-­‐beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  suitable	  religious	  experiences	  then	  this	  puts	  one	  
in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  
	   Before	  moving	  ahead	  it	  is	  probably	  worth	  noting	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  while	  our	  
proposal	  depends	  quite	  crucially	  upon	  the	  groundwork	  that	  Alston	  (1991)	  supplies,	  here	  we	  
go	  well	  beyond	  anything	  that	  Alston	  envisions	  himself	  arguing	  for.	  For	  as	  we	  have	  just	  seen	  
Alston	  is	  primarily	  interested	  to	  substantiate	  and	  defend	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  
religious	  beliefs—M-­‐beliefs—are	  susceptible	  of	  a	  distinctively	  religious	  perceptual	  rational	  
support.	  By	  contrast	  he	  has	  comparatively	  very	  little	  to	  say	  regarding	  theistic	  belief—or	  belief	  
in	  the	  existence	  of	  God.	  He	  certainly	  does	  not	  claim—as	  I	  maintain	  here—that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  
cogent	  proof	  for	  theism	  from	  premises	  that	  rely	  on	  one’s	  having	  rational	  support	  (or	  
justification)	  for	  M-­‐beliefs.3	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  if	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  suitable	  religious	  experiences	  one	  
can	  have	  rational	  support	  for	  thinking	  that	  God	  is	  manifesting	  Himself	  to	  one	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  
It	  is	  another	  thing	  entirely	  if	  this	  puts	  one	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  
for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  Here—of	  course—we	  are	  primarily	  interested	  to	  motivate	  the	  
latter	  claim.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Although	  some	  of	  his	  remarks	  suggest	  that	  he	  may	  have	  been	  sympathetic	  to	  our	  proposal.	  Very	  early	  on	  in	  his	  
book	  he	  writes	  “Am	  I	  suggesting	  that	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  is	  susceptible	  of	  a	  perceptual	  
justification?	  Well,	  yes	  and	  no.	  […]	  there	  is	  the	  point	  nicely	  made	  by	  Alvin	  Plantinga	  (1983,	  p.	  81)	  that	  even	  if	  
‘God	  exists’	  is	  not	  the	  propositional	  content	  of	  typical	  theistic	  perceptual	  beliefs,	  those	  propositional	  contents	  
self-­‐evidently	  entail	  it.	  ‘God	  is	  good’	  or	  ‘God	  gave	  me	  courage	  to	  meet	  that	  situation’	  self-­‐evidently	  entail	  ‘God	  
exists’,	  just	  as	  ‘That	  tree	  is	  bare’	  or	  ‘That	  tree	  is	  tall’	  self-­‐evidently	  entail	  ‘That	  tree	  exists’.	  Hence	  if	  the	  former	  
beliefs	  can	  be	  perceptually	  justified,	  they	  can	  serve	  in	  turn,	  by	  one	  short	  and	  unproblematic	  step,	  to	  justify	  the	  
belief	  in	  God’s	  existence”	  (1991,	  p.	  3-­‐4).	  It	  isn’t	  clear	  that	  Alston	  realized	  that	  if	  he	  is	  right	  about	  this,	  then	  there	  
is	  available	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘Moorean’-­‐style	  proof	  for	  theism	  that	  can	  confer	  independent	  rational	  support	  upon	  
theistic	  belief	  just	  as	  well	  as	  any	  of	  the	  classical	  theistic	  arguments.	  Neither	  is	  it	  clear	  that	  Alston	  realized	  that	  
there	  may	  be	  good	  objections	  to	  this	  idea,	  which	  we	  will	  consider	  here	  in	  great	  detail.	  	  	  	  
6	   A	  Plea	  for	  the	  Theist	  in	  the	  Street	  	  
III.	  The	  ‘Moorean’	  Proof	  for	  the	  Existence	  of	  God	  
	  
We	  are	  now	  in	  position	  to	  state	  more	  clearly	  the	  idea	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  my	  positive	  proposal.	  I	  
submit	  that	  if	  one	  knows	  that—for	  example—God	  is	  encouraging	  one	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
enjoying	  a	  religious	  experience	  to	  this	  effect	  then	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  one’s	  being	  in	  
position	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  one’s	  theistic	  belief.	  We	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  
what	  this	  means	  with	  reference	  to	  what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  
God,	  which	  I	  display	  here	  alongside	  G.E.	  Moore’s	  original	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
external	  world	  for	  comparison.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Now	  to	  be	  clear	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  is	  not	  a	  proof	  that	  Moore	  
himself	  advocated	  for.	  I	  give	  it	  this	  name	  only	  because	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  analogous	  in	  crucial	  
respects	  to	  Moore’s	  famous	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  Here	  is	  what	  I	  mean.	  
	   Recall	  that	  in	  his	  paper	  ‘Proof	  of	  an	  External	  World’	  (1939)	  Moore	  was	  keen	  to	  point	  
out	  that	  his	  original	  proof	  satisfied	  what	  he	  said	  were	  three	  important	  conditions	  of	  any	  
“sound	  proof”	  (his	  words).	  First	  its	  conclusion	  is	  different	  from	  the	  premises	  insofar	  as	  it	  may	  
have	  been	  true	  even	  if	  the	  premises	  were	  false.	  Second	  the	  conclusion	  clearly	  deductively	  
follows	  from	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  premises.	  And	  third	  Moore	  claimed	  that	  the	  premises	  were	  all	  
known	  to	  be	  true:	  the	  second	  premise	  a	  priori	  and	  the	  first	  by	  means	  of	  visual	  perceptual	  
experience.	  	  
	   This	  should	  strike	  us	  as	  interesting	  straight	  off	  since	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  reason	  why	  
the	  theist	  could	  not	  also	  claim	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  meets	  these	  
same	  three	  conditions.	  For	  its	  conclusion	  too	  is	  different	  from	  the	  premises	  in	  the	  relevant	  
way,	  and	  also	  follows	  from	  them	  with	  no	  less	  deductive	  certainty.	  Moreover	  why	  cannot	  the	  
theist	  also	  maintain	  that	  each	  of	  its	  premises	  can	  be	  known	  to	  be	  true?	  Premise	  (2)	  of	  course	  
is	  obviously	  knowable	  a	  priori—just	  like	  premise	  (2)	  of	  Moore’s	  original	  proof.	  But	  notice	  that	  
The ‘Moorean’ Proof for the Existence 
of God  
 
1) God is encouraging me just now.  
2) God is encouraging me just now 
only if God exists. 
 ---------- 
3) Therefore, God exists.  	  
Moore’s Proof for the Existence of the 
External World  
 
1) Here are my hands. 
2) Here are my hands only if an external 
world exists. 
 ---------- 
3) Therefore, the external world exists. 	  
premise	  (1)	  is	  just	  one	  of	  Alston’s	  M-­‐beliefs,	  and	  so—the	  theistic	  can	  maintain—knowable	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  its	  enjoying	  religious	  perceptual	  rational	  support.	  	  
	   I	  highlight	  these	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  proofs	  only	  to	  provide	  some	  initial	  
motivation	  for	  our	  Moorean	  proof	  for	  theism—for	  giving	  it	  serious	  consideration.	  If	  Moore	  
was	  correct	  to	  think	  that	  his	  original	  proof	  of	  the	  external	  world	  had	  something	  going	  for	  it,	  
then	  perhaps	  there	  is	  something	  interesting	  in	  this	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  God,	  
as	  well.	  There	  is	  more	  work	  to	  be	  done,	  however.	  For	  my	  specific	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  
proof	  for	  theism	  can	  be	  perfectly	  cogent.	  But	  it	  is	  now	  widely	  agreed	  that	  a	  proof	  can	  satisfy	  
each	  of	  Moore’s	  original	  three	  conditions	  without	  yet	  being	  cogent	  in	  the	  way	  I	  intend—that	  
is,	  without	  yet	  conferring	  upon	  its	  conclusion	  any	  rational	  support	  that	  doesn’t	  already	  
presuppose	  that	  one	  has	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  the	  conclusion.4	  
	   For	  example	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  Crispin	  Wright	  (2002)	  (2003)	  (2004)	  (2007)	  (2014)	  
has	  contended	  is	  the	  case	  with	  Moore’s	  original	  proof.	  Wright	  has	  long	  held	  to	  the	  
‘conservative’	  view	  that	  having	  visual-­‐perceptual	  rational	  support	  for	  an	  empirical	  belief	  
presupposes	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  (among	  other	  things)	  that	  there	  exists	  an	  
external	  world.	  It	  follows	  from	  that	  however	  that	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  
one	  has	  hands,	  for	  example,	  cannot	  constitute	  having	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  
believing	  that	  there	  exists	  an	  external	  world	  (despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  latter	  claim	  clearly	  
logically	  follows	  from	  the	  former).	  Wright’s	  initial	  thought	  was	  that	  this	  best	  explains	  the	  
widespread	  impression	  that	  Moore’s	  original	  proof	  is	  somehow	  a	  defective	  proof	  for	  its	  
conclusion.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  it’s	  defective	  because	  it	  isn’t	  cogent	  in	  the	  operative	  sense.5	  
Shortly	  we	  will	  consider	  whether	  a	  similar	  objection	  transfers	  over	  to	  problematize	  the	  
‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God.	  	  	  
	   The	  argumentative	  strategy,	  then,	  will	  be	  as	  follows.	  I’ll	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
clear	  obstacle	  to	  viewing	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  as	  a	  perfectly	  cogent	  proof—capable	  of	  
conferring	  via	  the	  relevant	  entailment	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  
exists.	  I’ll	  do	  this	  by	  constructing	  and	  undermining	  what	  I	  think	  are	  two	  primary	  objections	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Such	  cases	  are	  otherwise	  known	  as	  cases	  of	  ‘transmission	  failure’.	  For	  overview	  and	  discussion	  see	  Moretti	  and	  
Piazza	  (2013).	  5	  Compare	  Nico	  Silins	  (2005):	  “The	  main	  case	  for	  conservatism	  [i.e.	  Wright’s	  view]	  can	  usefully	  be	  stated	  as	  an	  
inference	  to	  the	  best	  explanation.	  The	  fact	  to	  be	  explained,	  for	  now	  just	  assuming	  there	  is	  such	  a	  fact,	  is	  that	  
Moore’s	  inference	  is	  not	  a	  way	  for	  him	  to	  acquire	  a	  well	  founded	  belief	  [in	  the	  proof’s	  conclusion].”	  Below	  I	  
consider	  and	  the	  reject	  the	  thought	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  is	  susceptible	  to	  a	  version	  of	  the	  same	  
worry.	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to	  this	  proposal.	  The	  most	  natural	  tack	  here	  is	  to	  appropriate	  key	  objections	  to	  the	  cogency	  of	  
Moore’s	  original	  proof	  that	  have	  come	  out	  of	  the	  conservatism	  vs.	  liberalism	  debate.	  And	  that	  
is	  precisely	  what	  I’ll	  do.	  Space	  constraints	  limit	  how	  far	  I	  can	  pursue	  the	  connections	  between	  
the	  conservatism	  vs.	  liberalism	  debate	  and	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God.	  My	  more	  modest	  aim	  
is	  to	  do	  enough	  to	  get	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  on	  the	  table	  for	  discussion.	  	  
	   But	  first,	  what	  exactly	  does	  having	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  theism	  consist	  in?	  
What	  would	  it	  be	  to	  enjoy	  such	  rational	  support	  by	  virtue	  of	  enjoying	  the	  relevant	  rational	  
support	  for	  an	  M-­‐belief?	  So	  far	  we	  have	  assumed	  an	  intuitive	  notion.	  But	  before	  proceeding	  
we	  should	  get	  clearer	  on	  what	  this	  means.	  I’ll	  do	  this	  by	  contrasting	  what	  Jim	  Pryor	  (2004)	  
calls	  “type-­‐4”	  and	  “type-­‐5”	  epistemic	  dependence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
IV.	  What	  is	  Meant	  by	  ‘Independent’	  Rational	  Support?	  
	  
It	  will	  be	  helpful	  in	  what	  follows	  to	  consider	  the	  following	  rendition	  of	  our	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  
for	  God,	  which	  is	  designed	  to	  help	  make	  explicit	  the	  religious-­‐perceptual	  rational	  support	  that	  
it	  purports	  to	  independently	  confer	  upon	  theism	  through	  the	  relevant	  entailment:	  
	  
The	  ‘Moorean’	  Proof	  for	  God	  (I-­‐II-­‐III)	  
	  
	   GOD	  (I)	  Religious	  experience	  as	  of	  God’s	  encouraging	  me.	  
	   GOD	  (II)	  God	  is	  encouraging	  me	  (M-­‐belief).	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	   GOD	  (III)	  Therefore,	  God	  exists	  
	   	   	   (Since	  God	  is	  now	  encouraging	  me	  only	  if	  God	  exists)6	  
	  
Note	  that	  when	  I	  imagine	  the	  theist	  referencing	  an	  M-­‐belief	  (GOD	  (II))	  in	  attempt	  to	  display	  
her	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  she	  is	  citing	  something	  for	  
which	  she	  enjoys	  immediate	  rational	  support	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  religious	  experience	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Here	  I	  am	  applying	  the	  same	  (I-­‐II-­‐III)	  structure	  that	  Crispin	  Wright	  has	  made	  famous	  in	  connection	  with	  
discussion	  of	  Moore’s	  original	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  external	  world	  (for	  a	  recent	  presentation	  see	  Wright	  
2014).	  Note	  that	  here	  GOD	  (1)	  serves	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  one’s	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  premise	  (1)	  of	  
the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  rests	  on	  one’s	  having	  a	  suitable	  religious	  experience.	  That	  shouldn’t	  be	  confused	  
with	  thinking	  that	  GOD	  (I)	  it	  itself	  a	  premise	  in	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God.	  It	  isn’t.	  	  
That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  a	  religious	  experience	  can	  rationally	  support	  a	  suitable	  M-­‐belief	  directly—
not	  by	  means	  of	  providing	  one	  with	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  anything	  else.7	  This	  of	  
course	  entails,	  for	  example,	  that	  one	  needn’t	  believe	  that	  one	  is	  having	  a	  religious	  experience	  
that	  p	  in	  order	  to	  enjoy	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  experience.8	  	  
	   Now	  Jim	  Pryor	  (2004)	  highlights	  at	  least	  five	  ways	  that	  the	  premises	  of	  an	  argument	  
might	  be	  said	  to	  depend	  upon	  (or	  else	  be	  independent	  of)	  the	  argument’s	  conclusion.	  We	  
need	  only	  consider	  two	  of	  Pryor’s	  five	  ways	  here:	  what	  he	  calls	  “type-­‐4”	  and	  “type-­‐5”	  epistemic	  
dependence.	  Following	  Pryor	  we	  can	  say	  that	  type-­‐5	  dependence	  is	  instantiated	  in	  a	  proof	  
when	  its	  conclusion	  is	  such	  that	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  thinking	  it	  true	  is	  among	  the	  
conditions	  that	  underwrite	  one’s	  having	  the	  relevant	  rational	  support	  for	  (at	  least	  one	  of)	  the	  
premises	  (ibid.,	  p.	  359).	  If	  the	  Moorean	  proof	  for	  theism	  exhibits	  type-­‐5	  epistemic	  
dependence	  then	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  GOD	  (II)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  GOD	  (I)	  would	  
presuppose	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  GOD	  (III)	  in	  this	  way.	  That	  would	  then	  preclude	  the	  
sequence	  from	  generating	  through	  the	  relevant	  entailment	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  
God	  exists	  that	  does	  not	  already	  require	  one’s	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  
exists.	  This	  is	  plausibly	  the	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  dependence	  that	  Duncan	  Pritchard	  (see	  quote	  
above)	  has	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  denies	  that	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  propositions	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  religious	  experiences,	  religious	  scriptures,	  etc.,	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  having	  non-­‐dependent	  (i.e.	  
independent)	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  	  
	   To	  be	  clear,	  then,	  I	  mean	  to	  defend	  what	  is	  being	  denied	  here.	  I	  mean	  to	  be	  defending	  
the	  claim	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  theism	  can	  confer	  upon	  ordinary	  theistic	  belief	  
independent	  rational	  support	  of	  the	  type	  that	  is	  precluded	  by	  Pryor’s	  type-­‐5	  epistemic	  
dependence.	  	  
	   Now	  this	  is	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  ‘independent	  rational	  support’	  of	  the	  type	  that	  is	  
precluded	  by	  what	  Pryor	  calls	  type-­‐4	  epistemic	  dependence.	  Again	  following	  Pryor,	  we	  can	  
say	  that	  type-­‐4	  epistemic	  dependence	  is	  instantiated	  in	  a	  proof	  when	  its	  conclusion	  is	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Compare	  Pryor	  (2000,	  p.	  532):	  “Say	  that	  you	  are	  “immediately	  justified”	  in	  believing	  p	  […]	  iff	  you’re	  justified	  in	  
believing	  p,	  and	  this	  justification	  doesn’t	  rest	  on	  any	  evidence	  or	  justification	  you	  have	  for	  believing	  other	  
propositions.”	  8	  Thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  requesting	  clarification	  on	  this	  matter.	  Not	  also	  that	  I	  take	  for	  granted	  
that	  religious	  perceptual	  experiences—like	  visual	  perceptual	  experiences—get	  us	  on	  to	  things	  (in	  part)	  by	  
representing	  those	  things	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  way.	  Religious	  perceptual	  experiences	  can	  then	  be	  seen	  to	  justify	  M-­‐
beliefs	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  propositional	  contents:	  their	  representing	  that	  things	  are	  a	  given	  way	  (at	  a	  given	  time).	  
It	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  what	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  religious	  experiences	  can	  be,	  and	  how	  they	  come	  to	  
have	  those	  truth-­‐conditions.	  But	  this	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  project.	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that	  acquiring	  rational	  support	  for	  thinking	  it	  false	  would	  undermine	  the	  relevant	  rational	  
support	  you	  purport	  to	  have	  for	  (at	  least	  one	  of)	  the	  premises	  (ibid.,	  p.	  359).	  The	  ‘Moorean’	  
proof	  for	  God	  exhibits	  type-­‐4	  epistemic	  dependence	  if	  acquiring	  rational	  support	  for	  thinking	  
that	  God	  does	  not	  exist	  tends	  to	  undermine	  the	  rational	  support	  one	  might	  (otherwise)	  have	  
for	  adopting	  an	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  religious	  experience.	  I	  leave	  it	  an	  open	  
question	  whether	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  But	  notice	  that	  even	  if	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  exhibits	  
type-­‐4	  dependence,	  that	  doesn’t	  by	  itself	  entail	  that	  it	  exhibits	  type-­‐5	  epistemic	  dependence,	  
rendering	  it	  incapable	  of	  generating	  the	  kind	  of	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  theism	  that	  
is	  of	  central	  interest.9	  	  
	   I	  trust	  this	  serves	  to	  bring	  out	  more	  clearly	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  I	  mean	  to	  defend	  the	  
claim	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  can	  be	  a	  cogent	  proof—conferring	  independent	  
rational	  support	  upon	  its	  conclusion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  
V.	  The	  Objection	  from	  the	  Apparent	  Defectiveness	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  Proof	  for	  God	  
	  
The	  first	  objection	  to	  our	  positive	  proposal	  that	  I	  will	  consider	  begins	  with	  this	  thought:	  But	  
isn’t	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God,	  like	  Moore’s	  original	  proof,	  clearly	  defective	  in	  some	  sense?	  
Isn’t	  it—in	  some	  way—not	  a	  very	  good	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God?	  Above	  we	  noted	  that	  
this	  can	  seem	  like	  good	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  Moore’s	  original	  proof	  cannot	  possibly	  
confer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  an	  external	  world	  exists	  (providing	  
initial	  motivation	  behind	  ‘conservatism’	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception).	  But	  then	  isn’t	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  What	  is	  the	  bearing	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  on	  this?	  Does	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  at	  all	  undermine	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  
street’s	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  an	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  religious	  experience?	  Not	  in	  my	  
view.	  First,	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  our	  view	  only	  if	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  exhibits	  type-­‐4	  
epistemic	  dependence:	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  only	  if	  acquiring	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  does	  not	  exist	  
tends	  to	  undermine	  one’s	  rational	  support	  for	  adopting	  an	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  religious	  
experience.	  But,	  as	  I	  say,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  the	  rational	  support	  one	  enjoys	  for	  premise	  (1)	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  
proof	  for	  God	  depends	  upon	  the	  claim	  that	  God	  exists	  in	  this	  way.	  Perhaps	  it	  does	  depend	  in	  this	  way	  on	  the	  
following	  claim:	  that	  putative	  religious	  experiences	  are	  the	  result	  of	  purely	  natural	  causes	  in	  the	  brain.	  Perhaps	  
having	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  undermines	  one’s	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  an	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  a	  religious	  experience.	  But	  that	  is	  irrelevant,	  since	  arguments	  from	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  do	  not	  (directly)	  
support	  that	  claim	  anyway.	  Second,	  but	  even	  if	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  exhibits	  type-­‐4	  dependence,	  the	  
typical	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  is	  committed	  to	  various	  other	  (religious)	  assumptions	  against	  the	  background	  of	  
which	  the	  presence	  of	  evil	  does	  nothing	  to	  disconfirm	  that	  God	  exists,	  but	  rather	  confirms	  that	  God	  exists	  along	  
with	  certain	  auxiliary	  assumptions	  (i.e.	  God	  exists	  and	  created	  humankind	  free	  to	  chose	  evil).	  And	  so	  I	  don’t	  see	  
that	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  makes	  any	  special	  trouble	  for	  our	  positive	  proposal.	  Thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  
pressing	  me	  on	  this	  point.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this	  also	  ultimately	  good	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  cannot	  confer	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists?	  	  	  
	   We	  can	  frame	  the	  relevant	  objection	  here	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  explanatory	  challenge:	  If	  the	  
‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  really	  is	  cogent—really	  can	  confer	  independent	  rational	  support	  
upon	  theistic	  belief—then	  what	  else	  explains	  its	  seeming	  to	  go	  wrong	  as	  a	  good	  proof	  for	  the	  
existence	  of	  God?	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  provide	  some	  explanation	  here	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  
our	  positive	  proposal.	  I	  think	  that	  this	  challenge	  can	  be	  met.	  The	  trick	  is	  not	  to	  confuse	  
cogent	  proofs	  (in	  our	  sense)	  with	  dialectically	  effective	  arguments.	  What	  is	  the	  difference?	  
	   It	  may	  help	  initially	  to	  consider	  the	  distinction	  Ernest	  Sosa	  (2009,	  p.	  7)	  draws	  between	  
persuasive	  proofs	  and	  display	  proofs.	  Sosa	  writes	  that	  a	  mere	  display	  proof	  “is	  a	  valid	  
argument	  that	  displays	  premises	  on	  which	  one	  can	  rationally	  base	  belief	  in	  the	  conclusion,	  
without	  vicious	  circularity.”	  By	  contrast	  a	  persuasive	  proof,	  Sosa	  writes,	  is	  a	  “valid	  argument	  
that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  rationally	  persuade	  one	  to	  believe	  its	  conclusion,	  if	  one	  has	  put	  the	  
conclusion	  in	  doubt.”	  Adopting	  Sosa’s	  terminology	  for	  the	  moment,	  I	  want	  to	  say	  that	  we	  
should	  be	  thinking	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  as	  a	  species	  of	  display	  proof	  for	  theism.	  But	  
what	  is	  crucial	  is	  that	  this	  needn’t	  entail	  that	  it	  has	  the	  dialectical	  quality	  of	  being	  a	  good	  
persuasive	  proof—that	  it	  might	  be	  effective,	  for	  example,	  if	  presented	  to	  the	  religious	  sceptic	  
as	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God.	  In	  fact	  I	  think	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  is	  
dialectically	  ineffective	  in	  just	  this	  way.	  This	  should	  be	  reasonably	  straightforward.	  	  
	   I	  would	  think	  that,	  in	  general,	  a	  proof	  for	  a	  given	  conclusion	  is	  (potentially)	  
dialectically	  effective	  against	  one’s	  opponent	  only	  if	  she	  is	  not	  prevented	  from	  borrowing	  the	  
rational	  support	  (implicitly)	  being	  offered	  in	  support	  of	  the	  relevant	  premises.	  For	  example,	  a	  
proof	  can	  be	  dialectically	  ineffective	  in	  this	  regard	  if	  it	  begs	  the	  question	  against	  one’s	  
opponent	  in	  the	  way	  highlighted	  by	  Martin	  Davies	  (following	  Jackson	  1987):	  
	  
Begging	  the	  Question:	  Jackson’s	  Account	  (Basic	  Condition)	  
For	  one	  of	  the	  premises,	  P,	  which	  is	  supported	  (according	  to	  the	  speaker)	  by	  the	  consideration	  
or	  other	  evidence,	  C,	  a	  hearer	  who	  antecedently	  doubted	  the	  conclusion	  would	  be	  directly	  
rationally	  required	  to	  adopt	  assumptions	  […]	  against	  the	  background	  of	  which	  C	  would	  not	  
support	  P	  (Davies	  2009,	  p.	  348).	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It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  Moore’s	  original	  proof	  of	  the	  external	  world	  is	  dialectically	  ineffective	  
on	  account	  of	  ‘begging	  the	  question’	  against	  the	  external	  world	  sceptic	  in	  just	  this	  way.	  As	  
Davies	  (2009,	  p.	  346)	  highlights	  (agreeing	  with	  ‘liberals’	  like	  Pryor	  2004),	  if	  the	  external	  world	  
sceptic	  is	  convinced	  that	  there	  is	  no	  external	  world—that,	  for	  example,	  she	  is	  being	  tricked	  by	  
an	  evil	  demon	  to	  believe	  that	  ordinary	  objects	  like	  hands	  exist—then	  it	  will	  do	  her	  no	  good	  to	  
be	  offered	  a	  proof	  to	  the	  contrary	  whose	  premises	  depend	  for	  their	  rational	  support	  upon	  the	  
relevant	  ‘hand-­‐like’	  visual	  experiences.	  That	  is	  because	  her	  external	  world	  scepticism	  makes	  
her	  committed	  to	  certain	  assumptions	  against	  the	  background	  of	  which	  visual	  experiences	  as	  
of	  hands	  should	  indicate	  not	  that	  one	  has	  hands,	  but	  rather	  that	  one	  is	  the	  handless	  
(epistemic)	  victim	  of	  an	  evil	  demon.	  Borrowing	  a	  locution	  from	  Jim	  Pryor	  (2004),	  we	  can	  say	  
that	  for	  this	  reason	  the	  external	  world	  sceptic	  is	  “rationally	  obstructed”	  from	  borrowing	  the	  
rational	  support	  Moore	  implicitly	  offers	  when	  he	  cites	  premise	  (1)	  of	  his	  original	  proof:	  
‘Look—here	  is	  one	  hand;	  and	  here	  is	  another’.	  
	   This	  is	  how	  ‘liberals’	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  visual	  perception	  defend	  the	  cogency	  of	  
Moore’s	  original	  proof	  against	  the	  relevant	  version	  of	  what	  I	  am	  calling	  here	  the	  explanatory	  
challenge.	  The	  proof	  looks	  defective	  not	  because	  it	  cannot	  confer	  for	  the	  nonsceptic	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  thinking	  that	  there	  is	  an	  external	  world,	  but	  because	  it’s	  
dialectically	  ineffective	  in	  the	  relevant	  way	  (cf.	  Pryor	  2004).	  I	  submit	  that	  the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  
for	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God.	  But	  we	  need	  to	  be	  careful.	  For	  while	  it	  is	  dialectically	  
ineffective,	  it	  isn’t	  clearly	  dialectically	  ineffective	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  Moore’s	  original	  
proof	  seems	  to	  be.	  	  	  
	   In	  order	  to	  see	  this,	  notice	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  which	  Moore’s	  rational	  support	  
for	  believing	  that	  he	  has	  hands	  is	  good	  for	  borrowing	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  theist’s	  rational	  
support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  is	  encouraging	  him/her	  is	  not.	  What	  do	  I	  mean?	  Well	  notice	  
that	  by	  drawing	  his	  opponent’s	  attention	  to	  his	  hands	  in	  the	  relevant	  way—“look:	  here	  are	  
hands”—Moore	  can	  induce	  in	  his	  opponent	  the	  very	  kind	  of	  visual	  experience	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
which	  he	  (Moore)	  enjoys	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  he	  has	  hands.	  By	  contrast,	  notice	  
that	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street’s	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  is	  encouraging	  him/her	  is	  
not	  likewise	  good	  for	  borrowing	  in	  this	  way.	  For	  unlike	  visual	  experiences,	  one	  cannot	  induce	  
religious	  experiences	  in	  one’s	  opponent	  simply	  by	  ‘pointing’	  to	  the	  world.	  Religious	  
experiences	  are	  just	  not	  like	  that.	  Why	  that	  is	  the	  case	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  that	  we	  
cannot	  pursue	  here.	  But	  this	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  since	  it	  means	  that	  while	  both	  Moore’s	  
original	  proof	  and	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  are	  dialectically	  ineffective	  against	  the	  
relevant	  opponents,	  they	  are	  ineffective	  for	  subtlety	  different	  reasons.	  For	  unlike	  Moore’s	  
rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  he	  has	  hands,	  in	  no	  situation	  can	  the	  theist	  offer	  for	  
borrowing	  his/her	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  is	  do	  thus	  and	  so.10	  	  
	   Objection:	  But	  certainly	  we	  can	  imagine	  that	  the	  theist	  is	  so	  greatly	  admired	  by	  her	  
opponent	  that,	  when	  she	  cites	  the	  content	  of	  some	  M-­‐belief,	  her	  opponent	  is	  rationally	  
persuaded	  to	  believe	  its	  content,	  and	  thereafter	  infer	  that	  God	  exists.	  But	  doesn’t	  that	  suggest	  
that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  can	  be	  dialectically	  effective,	  after	  all,	  so	  that	  the	  
explanatory	  challenge	  again	  rears	  its	  head?	  	  
	   The	  point	  is	  well	  taken.	  In	  response,	  however,	  we	  needn’t	  have	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
version	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  theism	  that	  is	  a	  (potentially)	  dialectically	  effective	  proof.	  
For	  notice	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  at	  issue,	  the	  rational	  support	  that	  the	  theist	  (implicitly)	  offers	  her	  
opponent	  for	  borrowing	  is	  plausibly	  her	  having	  testified	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  God	  has	  manifested	  
Himself	  to	  her	  in	  such	  and	  such	  a	  way—not	  the	  rational	  support	  that	  she	  has	  for	  accepting	  
premise	  (1)	  (i.e.	  the	  relevant	  religious	  experience).	  It	  is	  helpful	  then	  if	  we	  keep	  these	  two	  
versions	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  distinct:	  versions	  of	  the	  proof	  whose	  premises	  enjoy	  
rational	  support	  for	  someone	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  testimony,	  and	  versions	  of	  the	  proof	  whose	  
premises	  enjoy	  rational	  support	  for	  someone	  directly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  religious	  experience.	  
Whether	  versions	  of	  the	  proof	  of	  the	  former	  sort	  are	  cogent	  in	  our	  sense	  is	  an	  interesting	  
topic	  for	  further	  investigation.	  But	  here	  our	  focus	  is	  on	  versions	  of	  the	  proof	  of	  the	  latter	  sort.	  
It	  is	  enough	  to	  overcome	  the	  explanatory	  challenge	  if	  we	  can	  show	  how	  these	  versions	  of	  the	  
‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  are	  dialectically	  ineffective	  proofs.11	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   It	  seems	  to	  me	  then	  that	  the	  relevant	  explanatory	  challenge	  with	  which	  we	  started	  has	  
now	  been	  overcome.	  Even	  if	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  theism	  can	  confer	  independent	  rational	  
support	  upon	  theistic	  belief	  for	  subjects	  of	  religious	  experiences,	  that	  needn’t	  entail	  that	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Objection:	  But	  doesn’t	  this	  entail	  that	  only	  subjects	  of	  the	  relevant	  religious	  experiences	  can	  be	  ‘convinced’	  of	  
‘Moorean’-­‐style	  proofs	  for	  God?	  Doesn’t	  that	  seriously	  water	  down	  the	  epistemic	  efficacy	  of	  our	  M00re-­‐inspired	  
theistic	  proof?	  In	  response,	  this	  does	  seriously	  water	  down	  these	  proofs	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  argumentative	  power.	  
But	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  from	  that	  that	  these	  proofs	  are	  not	  epistemically	  powerful	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  able	  to	  
confer—for	  subjects	  of	  religious	  experiences—independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  Recall	  
that	  my	  very	  humble	  claim	  is	  that	  by	  citing	  the	  content	  of	  an	  M-­‐belief	  the	  theist	  can	  be	  citing	  something	  by	  
virtue	  of	  which	  she	  enjoys	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  Defending	  the	  cogency	  of	  
the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  is	  my	  chosen	  way	  of	  showing	  how	  that	  might	  be	  possible.	  I	  am	  not	  defending	  the	  
‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  stand	  up	  alongside	  more	  traditional	  theistic	  arguments.	  Thanks	  very	  
much	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  helping	  me	  to	  sort	  though	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  in	  this	  section.	  11	  Thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  raising	  this	  concern.	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cannot	  otherwise	  explain	  why	  it	  can	  appear	  defective.	  Plausibly	  proofs	  can	  be	  evaluated	  
against	  different	  criteria.	  And	  just	  because	  a	  proof	  is	  good	  for	  providing	  for	  subjects	  of	  
religious	  experiences	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  theistic	  belief,	  that	  needn’t	  entail	  that	  
it	  is	  good	  for	  rationally	  convincing	  someone	  over	  to	  one’s	  side.12	  	  	  
	   	  	  
VI.	  The	  Objection	  from	  Cognitive	  Locality	  
	  
VI.A	  Motivating	  the	  Objection	  
	  
In	  her	  book	  Extended	  Rationality	  Annalisa	  Coliva	  (2014)	  presents	  an	  objection	  against	  the	  
idea	  that	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  ordinary	  visual-­‐perceptual	  beliefs	  could	  constitute	  
having	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  there	  exists	  an	  external	  world.	  There	  
she	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  “the	  problem	  of	  surpassing	  our	  cognitive	  locality”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  61,	  my	  
emphasis).	  In	  this	  section	  I	  motivate	  a	  parallel	  objection	  against	  our	  positive	  proposal.	  Again	  
we	  will	  see	  that	  this	  objection	  threatens	  to	  undue	  our	  proposal	  according	  to	  which	  appealing	  
to	  the	  kind	  of	  rational	  support	  one	  enjoys	  for	  M-­‐beliefs	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  appealing	  to	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists—rational	  support	  that	  does	  not	  
presuppose	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  theism.	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  motivate	  this	  objection	  
before	  supplying	  a	  response.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Objection:	  It	  can	  be	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  one	  could	  not	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  God	  exists	  by	  reasoning	  one’s	  
way	  through	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God.	  For	  given	  that	  the	  proposition	  <God	  is	  encouraging	  
me>	  so	  clearly	  entails	  that	  <God	  exists>,	  it	  can	  seem	  that	  one	  cannot	  so	  much	  as	  understand	  what	  one	  believes	  
when	  one	  believes	  the	  former	  proposition	  unless	  one	  also	  believes	  the	  latter	  proposition	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  good	  to	  
think	  about.	  I’ll	  offer	  two	  quick	  remarks.	  First	  it	  isn’t	  obvious	  to	  me	  that	  one	  cannot	  believe	  that	  God	  is	  
encouraging	  one	  unless	  one	  believes	  that	  God	  exists.	  Certainly	  I	  think	  that	  one	  must	  be	  disposed	  to	  believe	  that	  
God	  exists.	  But	  being	  disposed	  to	  believe	  p	  doesn’t	  entail	  that	  one	  (even	  dispositionally)	  believes	  p.	  But	  perhaps	  
the	  worry	  here	  is	  more	  specific.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  that	  one	  cannot	  satisfy	  one’s	  curiosity	  whether	  God	  exists	  by	  
reasoning	  through	  the	  relevant	  premises	  of	  the	  proof.	  That	  is	  to	  say:	  perhaps	  one	  cannot—while	  entertaining	  the	  
proposition	  <God	  exists>—both	  believe	  that	  God	  is	  encouraging	  one,	  and	  understand	  what	  one	  believes,	  
without	  also	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  I	  am	  happy	  to	  concede	  this.	  But	  then	  notice,	  second,	  that	  nothing	  I’m	  
arguing	  for	  commits	  me	  otherwise.	  My	  main	  contention	  is	  that	  citing	  the	  content	  of	  an	  M-­‐belief	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  
referencing	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  That	  requires	  only	  the	  epistemological	  
thesis	  that	  one	  can	  enjoy	  rational	  support	  for	  an	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  religious	  experience	  without	  
first	  needing	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  the	  psychological	  thesis	  that	  one	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  God	  exists—perhaps	  for	  the	  first	  time—by	  carefully	  reasoning	  one’s	  way	  
through	  the	  relevant	  premises.	  Compare	  this	  quote	  from	  Pryor	  (2000,	  p.	  533):	  “You	  may	  require	  certain	  
background	  beliefs	  […]	  merely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  entertain	  some	  belief	  B.	  That	  doesn’t	  by	  itself	  show	  that	  your	  
justification	  for	  believing	  B	  rests	  on	  your	  justification	  for	  those	  background	  beliefs.”	  Thanks	  very	  much	  to	  a	  
referee	  for	  pressing	  me	  to	  say	  more	  about	  this.	  	  	  
	   I	  begin	  by	  tracing	  a	  familiar	  line	  of	  thought	  for	  adopting	  a	  form	  of	  fallibilism	  about	  the	  
rational	  support	  available	  for	  religious	  perceptual	  knowledge.13	  	  
	   Start	  off	  by	  considering	  this.	  Consider	  that	  for	  any	  ‘good’	  case	  in	  which	  one	  actually	  
perceives	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so	  we	  can	  define	  a	  corresponding	  ‘bad’	  case.	  The	  bad	  
case	  is	  introspectively	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  good	  case—except	  in	  this	  case	  it	  only	  seems	  
to	  one	  as	  though	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so	  because	  one	  is	  suffering	  from	  a	  delusional	  religious	  
experience.	  The	  bad	  case	  is	  bad,	  of	  course,	  because	  one	  is	  unwittingly	  misled	  by	  one’s	  
experience	  to	  adopt	  an	  M-­‐belief	  that	  is	  false.	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  the	  good	  case	  to	  be	  
introspectively	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  bad	  case	  in	  this	  way?	  I	  take	  it	  that	  it	  means	  that	  
even	  when	  one	  is	  in	  the	  good	  case,	  and	  so	  is	  actually	  successfully	  perceiving	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  
thus	  and	  so,	  one	  cannot	  tell	  by	  introspection	  alone	  that	  this	  is	  what	  is	  going	  on.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  
that	  one	  cannot—merely	  by	  introspecting	  upon	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  have	  one’s	  religious	  
experience—	  know	  that	  one’s	  religious	  experience	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  real	  encounter	  with	  God	  
as	  opposed	  to	  being	  produced	  in	  some	  purely	  naturalistic	  fashion.	  This	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  
controversial.14	  	  
	   Now	  it	  can	  be	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  this	  rather	  uncontroversial	  fact	  
that	  one	  has	  the	  same	  level	  of	  rational	  support	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  as	  one	  has	  in	  the	  good	  case	  for	  
accepting	  the	  relevant	  M-­‐belief.	  After	  all,	  from	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	  view	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  
things	  seem	  exactly	  as	  they	  do	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  one	  ‘from	  the	  
inside’	  just	  like	  one	  perceives	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so.	  Many	  will	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  deny,	  
then,	  that	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  has	  every	  reason	  one	  has	  in	  the	  good	  case	  for	  adopting	  the	  
relevant	  M-­‐belief.	  Of	  course	  it	  follows	  that	  since	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  the	  relevant	  M-­‐belief	  is	  false,	  
then	  even	  in	  the	  good	  case—where	  one	  successfully	  perceives	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  As	  I	  say	  below,	  I	  think	  that	  one’s	  rational	  support	  R	  for	  believing	  that	  p	  is	  fallible	  if	  having	  such	  rational	  
support	  is	  consistent	  with	  p’s	  being	  false.	  And	  so	  for	  example	  if	  one’s	  rational	  support	  for	  adopting	  a	  given	  M-­‐
belief	  that	  p	  consists	  entirely	  in	  its	  experientially	  seeming	  to	  one	  that	  p,	  then	  one’s	  rational	  support	  is	  fallible	  in	  
the	  operative	  sense.	  That	  is	  because	  it	  could	  experientially	  seem	  to	  one	  that	  p,	  even	  if	  one’s	  M-­‐belief	  that	  p	  is	  
false.	  ‘Fallibilism’	  has	  been	  used	  to	  denote	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  these.	  See	  Neta	  (2011)	  for	  a	  helpful	  catalogue.	  	  14	  Note	  that	  the	  relevant	  claim	  here	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  one	  cannot	  infallibly	  know	  by	  introspection	  alone	  that	  
one	  is	  in	  the	  good	  case	  rather	  than	  the	  bad	  case.	  Rather	  the	  claim	  is	  the	  more	  moderate	  one	  that,	  even	  in	  the	  
good	  case,	  one	  cannot	  know	  at	  all	  via	  introspection	  alone—not	  even	  fallibly—that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  good	  case	  rather	  
than	  the	  bad	  case.	  Notice	  that	  this	  is	  not	  yet	  to	  say	  that,	  in	  the	  good	  case,	  one	  cannot	  know	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  
good	  case	  rather	  than	  the	  bad	  case.	  Many	  will	  think	  that	  one	  can	  know	  this	  via	  inference	  from	  things	  one	  knows	  
via	  perception.	  As	  I	  say	  it	  isn’t	  meant	  to	  be	  controversial	  that	  in	  the	  good	  case	  one	  cannot—simply	  by	  
introspecting	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  one’s	  religious	  experience—tell	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  good	  case	  rather	  
than	  the	  bad	  case.	  See	  Pritchard	  (2012,	  p.	  38-­‐45)	  for	  relevant	  discussion.	  Thanks	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  requesting	  this	  
clarification.	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so—one	  cannot	  enjoy	  better	  than	  fallible	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  it.	  Fallible	  rational	  
support	  for	  p	  is	  rational	  support	  that	  one	  has	  even	  if	  p	  is	  false.	  And	  so,	  for	  example,	  many	  will	  
take	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  to	  indicate	  that	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  rational	  support	  that	  one	  has	  in	  the	  
good	  case	  for	  accepting	  an	  M-­‐belief	  consists	  in	  its	  seeming	  to	  one	  that	  one	  perceives	  that	  God	  
is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so:	  where	  this	  supplies	  rational	  support	  that	  one	  can	  have	  in	  both	  the	  good	  
case	  and	  the	  bad	  case.	  Thus	  we	  arrive	  at	  a	  seemingly	  plausible	  fallibilism	  about	  the	  rational	  
support	  available	  for	  religious	  perceptual	  belief.	  	  
	   Thus	  far	  we	  have	  not	  arrived	  at	  any	  particular	  problem	  for	  our	  positive	  proposal.	  But	  
now	  consider	  the	  following	  ‘arbitrariness’	  problem	  for	  the	  fallibilist	  view	  just	  arrived	  at.	  It	  can	  
now	  seem	  difficult	  to	  explain	  how—on	  the	  basis	  of	  it’s	  merely	  seeming	  to	  one	  that	  God	  is	  
doing	  thus	  and	  so—one	  ever	  has	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  is	  in	  fact	  doing	  thus	  
and	  so,	  when	  so	  easily,	  from	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	  view,	  one	  might	  just	  as	  well	  be	  in	  the	  bad	  
case	  (i.e.	  might	  be	  suffering	  a	  delusional	  religious	  experience	  in	  the	  naturalist’s	  world).	  To	  
speak	  as	  Coliva	  (ibid.,	  p.	  25)	  would	  in	  the	  present	  context:	  even	  if	  the	  theist	  were	  in	  the	  good	  
case—and	  so	  was	  lucky	  enough	  to	  have	  mostly	  veridical	  religious	  experiences—she	  should	  
still	  need	  some	  “subjectively	  available	  reason”	  for	  thinking	  that	  these	  experiences	  are	  at	  least	  
more	  likely	  caused	  by	  real	  encounters	  with	  God	  than	  by	  purely	  natural	  causes	  in	  the	  brain	  
and/or	  central	  nervous	  system.15	  Otherwise	  it	  can	  seem	  arbitrary	  for	  one	  to	  take	  oneself	  to	  
have	  rational	  support	  to	  believe	  the	  one	  hypothesis	  over	  the	  other.	  	  
	   	  A	  very	  natural	  way	  of	  overcoming	  this	  problem	  for	  the	  fallibilist	  is	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  
theist	  already	  has	  antecedent	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  things	  like	  ‘God	  exists’,	  ‘God	  acts	  
in	  ways	  that	  can	  be	  perceived	  by	  human	  beings’	  and	  etc.	  For	  in	  that	  case	  it	  would	  no	  longer	  
seem	  mysterious	  how	  one	  could	  have	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  that	  God	  is	  in	  fact	  doing	  
thus	  and	  so	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  such	  (fallible)	  rational	  support	  as	  one	  has	  when	  it	  ‘mystically’	  
seems	  to	  one	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so.	  For	  assume	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  one	  
enjoys	  such	  antecedent	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  theism	  (among	  other	  things).16	  Then	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Here	  is	  Coliva	  commenting	  on	  the	  version	  of	  the	  problem	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  rational	  support	  for	  visual-­‐
perceptual	  beliefs:	  “If	  one’s	  experiences	  could	  be	  just	  the	  same	  no	  matter	  how	  they	  are	  produced,	  why	  should	  
they	  justify	  beliefs	  about	  material	  objects	  rather	  than	  their	  sceptical	  counterparts?	  It	  seems	  entirely	  arbitrary	  to	  
take	  them	  to	  favor	  the	  former	  rather	  than	  the	  latter.	  […]	  We	  are	  (…)	  looking	  for	  conditions	  whose	  satisfaction	  
would	  allow	  us	  to	  take	  a	  mind-­‐dependent	  kind	  of	  evidence	  to	  bear	  on	  beliefs	  whose	  content	  is	  eminently	  mind-­‐
independent”	  (2014,	  p.	  61,	  my	  emphasis).	  16	  We	  need	  not	  bother	  here	  about	  what	  it	  would	  take	  for	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  to	  enjoy	  such	  collateral	  rational	  
support	  (although	  perhaps	  we	  may	  appeal	  to	  some	  notion	  of	  ‘rational	  trust’	  (cf.	  Wright	  2004,	  2014)).	  For	  our	  
clearly	  seems	  no	  longer	  arbitrary,	  from	  the	  theist’s	  point	  of	  view,	  to	  take	  its	  seeming	  that	  God	  
is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so	  to	  favor	  believing	  that	  God	  is	  in	  fact	  doing	  thus	  and	  so,	  over	  believing	  
instead	  that	  God	  does	  not	  exist	  and	  that	  one’s	  religious	  experiences	  are	  the	  product	  of	  purely	  
natural	  causes	  in	  one’s	  brain.17	  	  
	   Unfortunately,	  however,	  notice	  that	  these	  considerations	  do	  nothing	  to	  favor	  our	  
positive	  proposal.	  For	  if	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  an	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  
religious	  experience	  entails	  as	  a	  precondition	  that	  one	  has	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  
theism,	  then	  clearly	  appealing	  to	  the	  former	  rational	  support	  cannot	  be	  a	  way	  of	  offering	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  theistic	  belief—where,	  recall,	  this	  is	  rational	  support	  that	  
does	  not	  presuppose	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  Here	  is	  the	  
argument	  against	  our	  positive	  proposal	  stated	  slightly	  more	  formally.	  I	  present	  it	  as	  
consisting	  of	  two	  sub-­‐arguments.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Argument	  from	  Cognitive	  Locality	  
	  
	   	   Sub-­‐argument	  One	  
	  
1) The	  good	  case	  in	  which	  one	  perceives	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so	  is	  introspectively	  
indistinguishable	  from	  a	  corresponding	  bad	  case	  in	  which	  it	  only	  seems	  to	  one	  that	  
one	  is	  perceiving	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  and	  so	  because	  one	  is	  suffering	  a	  delusional	  
religious	  experience.	  [Premise]	  
2) If	  the	  good	  case	  is	  introspectively	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  bad	  case	  in	  this	  way,	  then	  
in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  has	  the	  same	  level	  of	  rational	  support	  that	  one	  has	  in	  the	  good	  case	  
for	  accepting	  a	  given	  M-­‐belief.	  [Premise]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
purposes	  we	  need	  only	  note	  that	  on	  the	  current	  objection	  one	  must	  first	  enjoy	  some	  such	  collateral	  rational	  
support	  before	  enjoying	  the	  relevant	  kind	  of	  rational	  support	  for	  a	  given	  M-­‐belief.	  Of	  course	  if	  the	  present	  
objection	  is	  successful	  and	  we	  cannot	  make	  our	  how	  one	  can	  enjoy	  this	  collateral	  rational	  support,	  then	  the	  idea	  
that	  M-­‐beliefs	  enjoy	  rational	  support	  at	  all	  becomes	  jeopardized.	  17	  Compare:	  the	  reason	  why—before	  looking—one’s	  evidence	  gives	  more	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  dice	  has	  
landed	  on	  something	  1-­‐5	  rather	  than	  on	  6	  is	  because	  one	  has	  collateral	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  fair	  
die,	  when	  tossed,	  will	  more	  likely	  land	  on	  something	  1-­‐5	  rather	  than	  on	  6.	  Plausibly	  this	  is	  why	  one	  has	  more	  
reason	  to	  believe	  the	  former	  rather	  than	  the	  latter	  hypothesis,	  even	  though	  one’s	  rational	  support	  is	  nonfactive	  
and	  therefore	  consistent	  with	  either	  hypothesis.	  	  	  
18	   A	  Plea	  for	  the	  Theist	  in	  the	  Street	  	  
3) Therefore,	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  has	  the	  same	  level	  of	  rational	  support	  as	  one	  has	  in	  the	  
good	  case	  for	  accepting	  a	  given	  M-­‐belief.	  [Intermediate	  Conclusion	  A,	  from	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  
MP].	  
4) If	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  enjoys	  the	  same	  level	  of	  rational	  support	  as	  one	  has	  in	  the	  good	  
case	  for	  accepting	  a	  given	  M-­‐belief,	  then	  one	  cannot	  enjoy	  better	  than	  fallible	  rational	  
support	  in	  the	  good	  case	  (obviously:	  for	  one	  cannot	  enjoy	  better	  than	  fallible	  rational	  
support	  in	  the	  bad	  case).	  [Premise]	  
5) Therefore,	  one	  enjoys	  at	  best	  fallible	  rational	  support	  for	  M-­‐beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
suitable	  religious	  experiences.	  [Intermediate	  Conclusion	  B,	  from	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  MP].	  
	  
	   Sub-­‐argument	  Two	  
	  
6) One	  enjoys	  at	  best	  fallible	  rational	  support	  for	  M-­‐beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  suitable	  
religious	  experiences	  only	  if	  one	  has	  antecedent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  
God	  exists.	  [Premise]	  
7) Therefore:	  One	  enjoys	  rational	  support	  for	  M-­‐beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  suitable	  religious	  
experiences	  only	  if	  one	  has	  antecedent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  
[Final	  Conclusion,	  from	  (5)	  and	  (6)	  MP]	  
8) Therefore,	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  an	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  religious	  
experience	  presupposes	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  
[Restatement	  of	  Final	  Conclusion].	  
	  
Perhaps	  it	  is	  some	  argument	  along	  these	  lines	  that	  undergirds	  the	  impression	  among	  
epistemologists	  like	  Duncan	  Pritchard	  (see	  quote	  above)	  that	  one	  cannot	  offer	  independent	  
rational	  support	  for	  theism	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  rational	  support	  conferred	  upon	  M-­‐
beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  religious	  experiences.	  However,	  as	  the	  reader	  may	  suspect,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  
open	  to	  the	  theistic	  epistemologist	  to	  reject	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  argument’s	  premises.	  Below	  I’ll	  
present	  my	  preferred	  strategy.	  I’ll	  motivate	  a	  rejection	  of	  premise	  (2)	  by	  way	  of	  appealing	  to	  




VI.B	  Religious	  Epistemological	  Disjunctivism	  
	  
If	  the	  argument	  from	  cognitive	  locality	  is	  vulnerable	  anywhere	  then	  I	  think	  it	  must	  be	  at	  
either	  (or	  both)	  premises	  (2)	  and	  (4).	  However	  to	  keep	  the	  discussion	  manageable,	  and	  to	  
offer	  what	  I	  think	  is	  novel	  solution	  to	  the	  problem,	  I’ll	  target	  only	  premise	  (2).	  Specifically	  I’ll	  
argue	  that	  we	  can	  motivate	  a	  rejection	  of	  premise	  (2)	  by	  appealing	  to	  religious	  
epistemological	  disjunctivism	  (cf.	  Shaw	  2016).	  With	  premise	  (2)	  thus	  kicked	  away,	  that	  will	  
then	  be	  the	  second	  putative	  obstacle	  to	  our	  proposal	  turned	  aside.	  
	   Notice	  that	  premise	  (2)	  makes	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  level	  of	  rational	  support	  a	  religious	  
experience	  can	  confer	  upon	  a	  given	  M-­‐belief.	  In	  effect,	  it	  exploits	  the	  following	  assumption:	  
that	  since	  the	  good	  case	  is	  introspectively	  indistinguishable	  form	  the	  bad	  case,	  therefore,	  
even	  when	  in	  the	  good	  case—even	  when	  one	  successfully	  perceives	  that	  God	  is	  doing	  thus	  
and	  so—one	  has	  the	  same	  level	  of	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  this	  as	  one	  would	  have	  
anyway	  if	  one	  were	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  and	  suffering	  a	  delusory	  religious	  experience.	  In	  other	  
words,	  the	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  even	  in	  the	  good	  case	  one’s	  rational	  support	  is	  the	  ‘highest	  
common	  factor’	  of	  the	  rational	  support	  made	  available	  in	  both	  the	  good	  and	  the	  bad	  case.18	  
But	  then	  since	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  doesn’t	  enjoy	  better	  than	  fallible	  rational	  support	  for	  an	  
M-­‐belief,	  it	  follows	  that	  one	  cannot	  enjoy	  better	  than	  fallible	  rational	  support	  in	  the	  good	  
case,	  either.	  And	  then	  sub-­‐argument	  two	  proceeds.	  	  
	   But	  in	  reality	  the	  assumption	  being	  made	  here	  in	  premise	  (2)	  is	  controversial:	  viz.,	  that	  
it	  follows	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  cases	  are	  introspectively	  indistinguishable	  that	  one’s	  
rational	  support	  in	  the	  good	  case	  should	  consist	  of	  what	  is	  the	  ‘highest	  common	  factor’	  
between	  the	  good	  and	  bad	  cases.	  For	  example,	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  about	  visual-­‐
perceptual	  rational	  support	  explicitly	  denies	  this,	  and	  I	  see	  no	  good	  reason	  why	  we	  cannot	  
take	  up	  the	  disjunctivist	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  rational	  support	  furnished	  by	  religious	  
perceptual	  experiences	  as	  well.19	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	  ‘highest	  common	  factor’	  is	  one	  of	  John	  McDowell’s	  favorite	  locutions	  used	  to	  characterize	  the	  sort	  of	  idea	  
motivating	  premise	  (2),	  which	  premise	  we	  are	  presently	  seeking	  to	  undermine	  under	  his	  inspiration.	  See	  
McDowell	  (1982)	  (1994)	  (1995)	  (2011).	  19	  For	  an	  accessible	  defense	  of	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  consult	  Pritchard	  (2012)	  (2016),	  whose	  presentation	  
of	  the	  view	  is	  inspired	  by	  John	  McDowell	  (1982)	  (1994)	  (1995)	  (2011).	  For	  application	  of	  the	  view	  to	  the	  case	  of	  
religious	  perceptual	  knowledge	  see	  Shaw	  (2016).	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   For	  example	  Kegan	  Shaw	  (2016)	  motivates	  a	  religious	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  
that	  entails	  that	  the	  good	  and	  bad	  cases	  are	  not	  on	  a	  par	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  level	  of	  rational	  
support	  available	  for	  suitable	  M-­‐beliefs.	  More	  specifically	  he	  presents	  a	  case	  of	  thinking	  that	  
when	  one	  knows	  some	  M-­‐belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suitable	  religious	  experience	  one	  can	  enjoy	  
infallible	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  what	  one	  does—infallible	  insofar	  as	  this	  is	  rational	  
support	  that	  one	  has	  only	  if	  the	  relevant	  M-­‐belief	  is	  true.20	  Says	  Shaw:	  “the	  big	  idea	  is	  that	  in	  
paragon	  cases	  of	  religious	  perceptual	  knowledge	  that	  p	  one	  knows	  that	  p	  by	  virtue	  of	  enjoying	  
rational	  support	  furnished	  by	  one’s	  pneuming	  that	  p,	  where	  this	  mental	  state	  is	  both	  factive	  
and	  accessible	  on	  reflection”	  (2016,	  p.	  265,	  my	  emphasis).	  Shaw	  intends	  “pneuming	  that	  p”	  to	  
stand	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  religious-­‐perceptual	  analogue	  to	  “seeing	  that	  p”,	  or	  to	  whatever	  epistemic	  
seeing	  amounts	  to	  in	  the	  religious-­‐perceptual	  case.	  Note	  that	  obviously	  one	  cannot	  enjoy	  any	  
such	  infallible	  rational	  support	  for	  an	  M-­‐belief	  in	  the	  bad	  case—since	  in	  that	  case	  it	  is	  
stipulated	  that	  the	  relevant	  M-­‐belief	  is	  false.	  Even	  still	  the	  key	  idea	  is	  that	  we	  should	  not	  
think	  that	  just	  because	  the	  good	  case	  is	  introspectively	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  bad	  case	  
that	  therefore	  one	  cannot	  have	  better	  than	  fallible	  rational	  support	  in	  the	  good	  case.21	  Why	  
not	  think	  instead	  that	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  (blamelessly)	  takes	  oneself	  to	  have	  rational	  support	  
one	  does	  not	  in	  fact	  have?	  	  
	   On	  the	  view	  that	  results,	  then,	  a	  case	  in	  which	  one	  enjoys	  a	  religious	  experience	  as	  of	  p	  
is	  either	  a	  case	  in	  which	  one	  enjoys	  infallible	  rational	  support	  for	  p,	  or	  a	  case	  that	  is	  merely	  
introspectively	  indistinguishable	  from	  a	  case	  of	  that	  kind.	  That	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  view	  a	  kind	  
of	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  about	  the	  rational	  support	  available	  for	  religious-­‐perceptual	  
based	  knowledge.22	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Note	  that	  this	  doesn’t	  entail	  that	  the	  capacity	  itself	  is	  infallible.	  As	  McDowell	  (2011)	  contends,	  there’s	  room	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  capacities	  according	  to	  which	  fallible	  capacities	  can	  put	  one	  in	  position	  to	  enjoy	  infallible	  rational	  support	  for	  perceptual	  beliefs.	  	  21	  Perhaps	  it	  can	  seem	  that	  one	  cannot	  really	  have	  access	  to	  factive	  rational	  support	  in	  the	  good	  case	  unless	  the	  
good	  case	  really	  isn’t	  introspectively	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  bad	  case	  after	  all—contrary	  to	  hypothesis?	  This	  
Pritchard	  calls	  the	  ‘distinguishability	  problem’	  for	  epistemological	  disjunctivism.	  For	  relevant	  discussion	  see	  
Pritchard	  (2012	  b,	  pt	  2.).	  The	  interested	  reader	  will	  discover	  that	  the	  response	  Pritchard	  makes	  available	  to	  that	  
problem	  can	  easily	  be	  pressed	  into	  service	  in	  defense	  of	  religious	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  against	  the	  
parallel	  objection.	  	  	  22	  Religious	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  says	  only	  that	  religious	  perceptual	  knowledge	  can	  enjoy	  infallible	  
rational	  support,	  in	  virtue	  of	  one’s	  being	  in	  such	  a	  factive	  mental	  state	  as	  pneuming	  that	  p.	  It	  does	  not	  say	  that	  
one	  must	  be	  in	  some	  such	  factive	  state	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  religious	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Nor	  does	  it	  say	  that	  
in	  general	  only	  factive	  states	  serve	  to	  rationally	  support	  beliefs,	  as	  may	  be	  entailed	  on	  one	  interpretation	  of	  
Williamson’s	  evidence	  =	  knowledge	  thesis	  (cf.	  Williamson	  2000).	  Thanks	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  requesting	  this	  
clarification.	  	  	  	  
	   Clearly	  we	  haven’t	  the	  space	  to	  explore	  or	  motivate	  religious	  epistemological	  
disjunctivism	  in	  any	  great	  detail	  (but	  again	  see	  Shaw	  2016).	  But	  for	  my	  own	  part	  I	  think	  that	  
it’s	  a	  view	  worth	  taking	  seriously,	  not	  least	  because	  it	  promises	  to	  pay	  dividends	  in	  religious	  
epistemology	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  I	  presently	  trying	  to	  highlight.	  For	  if	  the	  view	  is	  available	  then	  
we	  can	  use	  it	  for	  motivating	  a	  rejection	  of	  premise	  (2)	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  cognitive	  
locality,	  freeing	  our	  positive	  proposal	  from	  what	  might	  otherwise	  look	  like	  a	  fairly	  serious	  
difficulty.	  For	  if	  religious	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  is	  true	  then	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  if	  the	  
good	  and	  bad	  cases	  are	  introspectively	  indistinguishable	  then	  one	  enjoys	  the	  same	  level	  of	  
rational	  support	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  as	  one	  enjoys	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  That	  is	  false	  if—as	  religious	  
epistemological	  disjunctivism	  says—one	  can	  enjoy	  in	  the	  good	  case	  as	  good	  as	  infallible	  
rational	  support	  for	  M-­‐beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  suitable	  religious	  experiences.	  
	   Note	  that	  in	  this	  way	  religious	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  can	  seem	  even	  more	  
attractive	  than	  Shaw	  (2016)	  initially	  lets	  on.	  Since	  in	  that	  paper	  he	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  
fact	  that	  it	  may	  be	  a	  key	  to	  unlocking	  a	  view	  in	  religious	  epistemology	  according	  to	  which	  
even	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  can	  enjoy	  knowledge	  that	  God	  exists	  that	  is	  rationally	  grounded	  
in	  a	  robust	  fashion—such	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  
in	  defense	  of	  their	  theistic	  belief.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   By	  now	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  said	  enough	  to	  at	  least	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  reason	  for	  
thinking	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  cannot	  represent	  a	  perfectly	  
cogent	  proof	  for	  theism;	  so	  that	  if	  there	  really	  are	  perceptions	  of	  God	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  Alston	  
highlights,	  then	  these	  put	  even	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  
rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  At	  the	  very	  least	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  put	  the	  position	  
on	  the	  table	  for	  serious	  consideration.	  Potentially	  there	  is	  much	  as	  stake.	  For	  if	  what	  I	  have	  
been	  arguing	  for	  is	  correct	  then,	  contrary	  to	  popular	  opinion,	  knowledge	  that	  God	  exists	  that	  
is	  rationally	  grounded	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  is	  actually	  ubiquitous—not	  the	  property	  only	  of	  
academically-­‐minded	  theists	  who	  are	  in	  position	  to	  produce	  a	  good	  argument	  for	  the	  
existence	  of	  God.	  	  
	   Before	  closing	  I	  would	  like	  to	  briefly	  address	  three	  further	  issues	  that	  the	  reader	  may	  
wish	  to	  get	  clearer	  about.	  I’ll	  say	  something	  about	  why	  appealing	  to	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  
‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  theism	  in	  defense	  of	  one’s	  theistic	  belief	  is	  different	  from	  offering	  a	  
version	  of	  the	  more	  familiar	  ‘argument	  from	  religious	  experience’.	  I’ll	  say	  something	  about	  
whether	  I	  think	  this	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  there	  being	  cogent	  proofs	  for	  theism	  beginning	  from	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premises	  rooted	  in	  Scripture.	  And	  finally	  I’ll	  offer	  some	  remarks	  relating	  our	  discussion	  to	  
reformed	  epistemology.	  	  
	  
VII.	  The	  ‘Argument	  from	  Religious	  Experience’	  
	  
Needless	  to	  say	  throughout	  we	  have	  been	  highly	  dependent	  upon	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  religious	  
experience.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  rational	  support	  one	  
enjoys	  for	  M-­‐beliefs	  in	  defense	  of	  one’s	  theistic	  belief	  one	  is	  offering	  only	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  
better-­‐known	  ‘argument	  from	  religious	  experience’.	  But	  that	  is	  wrong.	  To	  see	  why	  consider	  
this	  relatively	  recent	  representation	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  religious	  experience	  advanced	  by	  
Richard	  Swinburne	  (2004):	  
	  
	   Swinburne’s	  Argument	  from	  Religious	  Experience	  	  
	  
1) People	  not	  uncommonly	  have	  experiences	  that	  purport	  to	  be	  experiences	  of	  God’s	  
doing	  thus	  and	  so.	  	  
2) It	  is	  rational	  to	  believe	  what	  an	  experience	  apparently	  reports	  unless	  there	  is	  special	  
reason	  not	  to	  (Swinburne’s	  Principle	  of	  Credulity).	  
3) There	  is	  no	  special	  reason	  to	  be	  dismissive	  of	  religious	  experiences	  in	  this	  respect.	  
	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
4) Therefore,	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  believe	  that	  God	  exists.	  	  
	  
Notice	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  differs	  from	  this	  argument	  in	  at	  least	  
three	  respects.	  
	   First	  from	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  it	  follows	  that	  
God	  exists,	  not	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  believe	  that	  God	  exists.	  Clearly	  these	  are	  very	  different	  
conclusions.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  metaphysical	  claim,	  while	  the	  second	  an	  epistemic	  one.	  My	  
contention	  has	  been	  that	  religious	  experiences	  put	  one	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  
rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists—not	  for	  believing	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  believe	  
that	  God	  exists.	  	  
	   Second—even	  if	  we	  framed	  the	  argument	  from	  religious	  experience	  so	  that	  it	  delivered	  
the	  relevant	  metaphysical	  claim—notice	  that	  the	  concept	  ‘religious	  experience’	  figures	  
nowhere	  in	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God.	  That	  is	  a	  relevant	  difference	  and	  a	  
significant	  one	  at	  that.	  For	  plausibly	  the	  average	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  does	  not	  have	  the	  
concept	  of	  religious	  experience	  as	  this	  notion	  figures	  in	  the	  above	  argument—i.e.	  as	  the	  
mental	  condition	  that	  is	  neutral	  between	  religious	  perceptions	  and	  merely	  delusional	  
religious	  experiences.	  But	  while	  this	  may	  preclude	  one	  from	  being	  able	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  
argument	  from	  religious	  experience	  in	  defense	  of	  their	  theistic	  belief,	  it	  isn’t	  clear	  that	  it	  
precludes	  one	  from	  being	  able	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  theism	  for	  
offering	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  accepting	  theistic	  belief.	  	  
	   Finally	  clearly	  the	  argument	  from	  religious	  experience	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  a	  dialectically	  
effective	  argument	  for	  its	  conclusion.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  each	  of	  the	  premises	  enjoys	  rational	  
support,	  plausibly	  this	  rational	  support	  is	  “good	  for	  borrowing”	  in	  the	  way	  that	  one’s	  rational	  
support	  for	  accepting	  premise	  (1)	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  is	  not	  (see	  above	  discussion).	  
The	  reader	  is	  invited	  to	  check	  this	  for	  themselves.	  	  	  
	  
VIII.	  Concerning	  ‘Proofs’	  from	  Scripture	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  forgoing	  consider	  now	  this	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  presented	  again	  in	  
terms	  of	  Wright’s	  (I-­‐II-­‐III)	  structure:	  
	  
	   Scripture	  (I-­‐II-­‐III)	  
	  
	   SCRIPT	  (1)	  	  	  The	  Scriptures	  report	  that	  God	  met	  with	  Moses	  on	  Mount	  Sinai.	  
	   SCRIPT	  (II)	  	  	  So,	  God	  met	  with	  Moses	  on	  Mount	  Sinai.	  
	   	   	   	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	   SCRIPT	  (III)	  	  Therefore,	  God	  exists	  
	   	   	   	   (Since	  God	  met	  with	  Moses	  on	  Sinai	  only	  if	  God	  exists)	  
	  
Notice	  that	  this	  proof	  seems	  to	  satisfy	  all	  of	  G.E.	  Moore’s	  three	  original	  criteria	  for	  any	  “sound	  
proof”.	  Its	  conclusion	  both	  deductively	  follows	  from	  the	  premises	  and	  is	  different	  from	  them	  
in	  the	  relevant	  way.	  Moreover	  it	  seems	  open	  to	  the	  theist	  to	  claim	  that	  each	  of	  the	  premises	  
can	  be	  known.	  The	  next	  question	  is	  whether	  we	  should	  also	  think	  that	  it	  is	  cogent—whether	  
or	  not	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  SCRIPT	  (II)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  SCRIPT	  (I)	  presupposes	  having	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rational	  support	  for	  SCRIPT	  (III).	  The	  reader	  may	  be	  concerned	  that	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  
God	  is	  cogent	  only	  if	  such	  proofs	  from	  Scripture	  are	  as	  well—and	  yet	  it	  is	  implausible	  to	  think	  
that	  proofs	  from	  Scripture	  can	  be	  cogent.	  This	  requires	  more	  comment	  that	  I	  can	  offer	  here—
but	  I	  will	  offer	  two	  remarks.	  	  
	   First	  proofs	  from	  Scripture	  may	  be	  vulnerable	  at	  a	  point	  where	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  
God	  is	  not.	  Recall	  the	  objection	  to	  our	  proposal	  from	  cognitive	  locality	  just	  discussed.	  Pressed	  
into	  service	  here	  the	  objection	  is	  that	  SCRIPT	  (I)	  provides	  fallible	  rational	  support	  for	  SCRIPT	  
(II)	  only	  if	  one	  has	  antecedent	  rational	  support	  for	  theism	  (i.e.	  SCRIPT	  (III)).	  For	  otherwise	  it	  
can	  seem	  arbitrary	  to	  take	  oneself	  to	  have	  rational	  support	  for	  SCRIPT	  (II)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
SCRIPT	  (I)	  when	  so	  easily—for	  all	  else	  one	  has	  rational	  support	  to	  believe—it	  may	  be	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  God	  and	  the	  Old	  Testament	  Scriptures	  at	  best	  present	  a	  highly	  embellished	  
historical	  account.	  Above	  we	  rendered	  innocuous	  the	  parallel	  objection	  in	  application	  to	  
religious-­‐perceptual	  rational	  support	  by	  appealing	  to	  an	  independently	  motivated	  
epistemological	  disjunctivism	  about	  religious	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Notice	  however	  that	  it	  is	  
hardly	  clear	  whether	  we	  can	  avail	  ourselves	  of	  the	  same	  strategy	  here.	  That	  would	  require	  
adopting	  an	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  about	  distinctively	  religious-­‐testimonial	  based	  
knowledge—a	  view	  that	  seems	  hardly	  plausible	  on	  its	  face.23	  And	  so	  there	  may	  be	  scope	  for	  
thinking	  that	  even	  if	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  theism	  can	  generate	  independent	  rational	  
support	  for	  its	  conclusion,	  proofs	  from	  Scripture	  cannot.	  	  
	   Secondly	  even	  if	  proofs	  from	  Scripture	  are	  cogent	  in	  some	  sense	  that	  needn’t	  entail	  
that	  there	  are	  not	  yet	  other	  important	  differences	  between	  such	  proofs	  and	  proofs	  that	  follow	  
the	  pattern	  of	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God.	  For	  instance	  notice	  that	  while	  the	  
‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  purports	  to	  confer	  perceptual-­‐based	  rational	  support	  upon	  theism,	  
the	  proof	  from	  Scripture	  purports	  to	  confer	  testimonially-­‐based	  rational	  support	  instead.	  
Potentially	  that	  is	  an	  important	  difference.	  The	  difference	  is	  between	  having	  rational	  support	  
for	  theism	  that	  is	  primarily	  attributable	  to	  the	  subject’s	  epistemic	  agency,	  and	  having	  rational	  
support	  for	  theism	  that	  is	  not.	  For	  notice	  that	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  rational	  support	  for	  a	  given	  
M-­‐belief	  one	  need	  only	  lean	  on	  one’s	  own	  epistemic	  powers—powers	  to	  perceive	  God’s	  
manifesting	  Himself	  in	  certain	  ways.	  By	  contrast	  notice	  that	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  the	  relevant	  
rational	  support	  for	  a	  claim	  rooted	  in	  Scripture	  one	  must	  crucially	  be	  relying	  on	  the	  epistemic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Although	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  isn’t	  precedent	  for	  an	  epistemological	  disjunctivism	  about	  
testimonially-­‐based	  knowledge.	  See	  McDowell	  (1994).	  	  	  
powers	  of	  another—potentially	  countless	  others—whomever	  ultimately	  is	  creditable	  for	  
obtaining,	  recording,	  and	  preserving	  the	  information	  contained	  in	  Scripture.	  In	  this	  way	  one	  
who	  has	  rational	  support	  for	  theism	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  claims	  rooted	  in	  
Scripture	  can	  seem	  less	  creditable	  than	  one	  who	  has	  rational	  support	  for	  theism	  by	  virtue	  of	  
having	  rational	  support	  sourced	  from	  religious	  experiences.	  The	  latter	  individual—we	  can	  
say—is	  fully	  epistemically	  creditable	  for	  having	  the	  relevant	  (independent)	  rational	  support	  
for	  theism.	  
	   Perhaps	  this	  is	  sufficient	  for	  privileging	  the	  ‘Moorean’	  proof	  for	  God	  over	  proofs	  from	  
Scripture,	  even	  if	  both—at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day—constitute	  cogent	  proofs	  for	  their	  conclusions.	  
If	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  complain	  that	  proofs	  from	  Scripture	  are	  too	  easy—not	  evincing	  enough	  
of	  an	  epistemic	  accomplishment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  subject—then	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  
accommodate	  that	  short	  of	  having	  to	  deny	  that	  these	  proofs	  can	  be	  cogent	  in	  some	  sense.	  
While	  there	  is	  plenty	  more	  here	  to	  think	  about	  I	  really	  must	  move	  on	  to	  make	  my	  final	  
comment.	  	  
	  
IX.	  Concerning	  Reformed	  Epistemology	  	  
	  
Perhaps	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  our	  positive	  proposal	  is	  somehow	  in	  tension	  with	  what	  is	  
known	  as	  ‘reformed	  epistemology’.24	  For	  doesn’t	  reformed	  epistemology	  set	  itself	  against	  the	  
picture	  that	  has	  now	  come	  into	  view:	  a	  picture	  according	  to	  which	  even	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  
street	  is	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists?	  I	  
maintain	  that	  nothing	  that	  I	  have	  proposed	  here	  is	  in	  any	  tension	  with	  reformed	  
epistemology.	  	  
	   As	  I	  think	  most	  understand	  reformed	  epistemology,	  it	  describes	  an	  approach	  to	  
thinking	  about	  familiar	  epistemic	  statuses—like	  for	  example	  rationality,	  justification,	  or	  
warrant—in	  application	  to	  theistic	  belief.	  In	  particular	  a	  reformed	  epistemologist	  will	  say	  that	  
a	  subject	  can	  enjoy	  some	  positive	  epistemic	  standing	  with	  respect	  to	  theistic	  belief	  
independently	  of	  possessing	  any	  good	  argument	  for	  thinking	  that	  God	  exists.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  For	  an	  accessible	  introduction	  to	  reformed	  epistemology	  see	  the	  Internet	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  entry	  on	  
the	  topic	  by	  Bolos	  and	  Scott.	  For	  a	  recent	  discussion	  of	  reformed	  epistemology	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  approach	  in	  
religious	  epistemology,	  see	  Dougherty	  and	  Tweedt	  (2015).	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  recent	  work	  in	  this	  area	  see	  Moon	  
(2016).	  
26	   A	  Plea	  for	  the	  Theist	  in	  the	  Street	  	  
	   But	  the	  first	  thing	  to	  notice	  is	  that	  here	  I	  have	  made	  no	  claims	  at	  all	  about	  rationality,	  
justification,	  or	  warrant	  with	  respect	  to	  theistic	  belief.	  I	  have	  simply	  wanted	  to	  suggest	  that	  
the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  is	  in	  position	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  
God	  exists.	  I	  have	  made	  no	  claims	  about	  whether	  being	  in	  such	  a	  position	  is	  either	  necessary	  
and/or	  sufficient	  or	  neither	  for	  enjoying	  any	  familiar	  epistemic	  status	  with	  respect	  to	  theistic	  
belief.	  In	  this	  way	  I	  have	  refrained	  from	  making	  any	  claims	  about	  what	  reformed	  
epistemology	  makes	  claims	  about.	  	  
	   The	  second	  thing	  to	  notice	  is	  that,	  in	  any	  case,	  reformed	  epistemology	  is	  supposed	  to	  
oppose	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  convincing	  arguments	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  sustaining	  theistic	  
belief.	  Not	  the	  importance	  of	  what	  we	  have	  here	  carefully	  distinguished	  as	  being	  in	  position	  
to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  theistic	  belief.	  I	  am	  happy	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  
reformed	  epistemologist	  if	  she	  thinks	  that	  ordinary	  theistic	  belief	  is	  not	  typically	  rationally	  
supported	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  argument	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  help	  bring	  the	  religious	  sceptic	  
around.	  	  
	   Now	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  our	  result	  should	  hold	  no	  interest	  for	  reformed	  
epistemologists.	  For	  if	  my	  proposal	  is	  correct	  then	  at	  the	  very	  least	  this	  affords	  ordinary	  
theistic	  belief	  some	  epistemic	  insurance	  against	  ongoing	  developments	  in	  religious	  
epistemology,	  and	  in	  epistemology	  more	  generally.	  Perhaps	  in	  future	  we	  will	  be	  offered	  good	  
reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  theistic	  belief	  cannot	  enjoy	  some	  important	  doxastic	  merit	  unless	  
one	  can	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists.	  Religious	  
nonsceptics	  need	  have	  nothing	  to	  fear	  from	  such	  prospects	  if	  my	  positive	  claim	  is	  sustainable.	  
And	  it’s	  not	  as	  though	  these	  prospects	  are	  very	  distant.	  	  
	   To	  take	  just	  one	  example,	  suppose	  John	  McDowell	  (1995)	  is	  correct	  that	  knowledge	  is	  a	  
“standing	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons”:	  or	  as	  he	  says—following	  Sellars	  (1963)—the	  space	  of	  
“justifying	  and	  being	  able	  to	  justify	  what	  one	  says”	  (2011,	  p.	  9).25	  It	  would	  follow	  that	  
knowledge	  that	  God	  exists,	  too,	  is	  a	  standing	  in	  this	  space	  of	  reasons—the	  space	  of	  being	  able	  
to	  justify	  what	  one	  says.	  But	  that	  would	  mean	  that	  it’s	  impossible	  to	  know	  that	  God	  exists	  
short	  of	  being	  able	  to	  justify	  this	  claim	  by	  offering	  adequate	  rational	  support	  for	  thinking	  it	  
true.	  If	  one	  can	  do	  that	  only	  if	  one	  can	  offer	  some	  rational	  support	  that	  doesn’t	  already	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  McDowell	  is	  often	  found	  quoting	  in	  approval	  the	  following	  statement	  from	  Wilfred	  Sellars	  (1963):	  “In	  
characterizing	  an	  episode	  or	  a	  state	  as	  that	  of	  knowing,	  we	  are	  not	  giving	  an	  empirical	  description	  of	  that	  
episode	  or	  state;	  we	  are	  placing	  it	  in	  the	  logical	  space	  of	  reasons,	  of	  justifying	  and	  being	  able	  to	  justify	  what	  one	  
says.”	  
presuppose	  that	  one	  has	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists—as	  seems	  
plausible26—then	  it	  follows	  that	  one	  cannot	  know	  that	  God	  exists	  unless	  one	  can	  offer	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  so.	  Part	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  what	  I	  have	  argued	  
for,	  then,	  consists	  in	  this.	  That	  even	  on	  an	  epistemology	  as	  ‘internalist’	  as	  McDowell’s	  we	  can	  
make	  out	  how	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  can	  know	  that	  God	  exists.	  	  
	   Moreover,	  notice	  that	  even	  if	  McDowell	  is	  wrong	  that	  knowledge	  consists	  in	  being	  able	  
to	  justify	  what	  one	  says,	  it	  is	  not	  unlikely	  that	  being	  in	  position	  to	  responsibly	  claim	  such	  
knowledge	  consists	  in	  being	  able	  to	  justify	  what	  one	  says	  in	  this	  way.	  For	  at	  least	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  claiming	  knowledge	  of	  things,	  there	  is	  undeniably	  some	  pressure	  to	  think	  that	  one	  
shouldn’t	  claim	  to	  know	  things	  that	  one	  cannot	  begin	  to	  offer	  adequate	  rational	  support	  for	  
thinking	  are	  true.27	  This	  is	  something	  that	  I	  suspect	  initially	  strikes	  many	  as	  commonsense.	  
But	  then	  notice	  that	  if	  my	  conclusions	  are	  wrong,	  then	  even	  if	  the	  theist	  knows	  that	  God	  
exists	  it	  may	  yet	  be	  unclear	  how	  she	  can	  responsibly	  claim	  to	  know	  that	  God	  exists	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  challenge.	  But	  if	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  I	  am	  right,	  and	  the	  theist	  can	  offer	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  theism	  by	  referencing	  M-­‐beliefs,	  then	  even	  if	  there	  are	  no	  
direct	  implications	  for	  ordinary	  theistic	  knowledge,	  we	  can	  at	  least	  vindicate	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  
street’s	  being	  in	  position	  to	  (responsibly)	  claim	  what	  she	  knows	  to	  be	  true.	  Much	  more	  could	  




	   At	  the	  beginning	  I	  said	  that	  I	  was	  going	  to	  endeavour	  to	  unlock	  a	  position	  in	  religious	  
epistemology	  that	  I	  have	  not	  seen	  defended	  before.	  The	  position	  is	  one	  according	  to	  which	  
even	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street	  can	  enjoy	  rationally	  grounded	  knowledge	  that	  God	  exists—where	  
this	  requires	  one	  to	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  their	  theistic	  belief.	  The	  
position	  might	  have	  seemed	  out	  of	  reach	  partly	  because	  it	  has	  been	  thought	  that	  unless	  one	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  This	  seems	  entirely	  plausible.	  For	  surely,	  if	  one	  offers	  (what	  is	  meant	  to	  be)	  rational	  support	  R1	  for	  believing	  
that	  God	  exists,	  except	  having	  this	  rational	  support	  presupposes	  (or	  depends	  upon)	  having	  antecedent	  rational	  
support	  R2	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists,	  then,	  for	  all	  either	  party	  knows,	  no	  rational	  support	  has	  yet	  been	  
offered	  for	  believing	  that	  God	  exists	  (until,	  of	  course,	  R2	  has	  been	  offered,	  where	  R2	  is	  suitably	  independent	  
rational	  support).	  	  	  27	  Notice:	  which	  is	  not	  (necessarily)	  to	  say	  that	  one	  should	  not	  believe	  things	  that	  one	  cannot	  begin	  to	  offer	  rational	  support	  for	  thinking	  are	  true.	  Knowledge	  itself	  may	  still	  not	  be	  a	  ‘standing	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons’	  in	  this	  way.	  	  28	  Thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  inspiring	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  this	  section.	  	  	  
28	   A	  Plea	  for	  the	  Theist	  in	  the	  Street	  	  
in	  possession	  of	  a	  dialectically	  effective	  argument	  then	  one	  cannot	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  offer	  
independent	  rational	  support	  for	  God’s	  existence.	  Here	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  dislodge	  that	  idea	  by	  
conducting	  a	  more	  careful	  study	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  
‘manifestation’	  beliefs	  and	  having	  rational	  support	  for	  theism.	  The	  result—I	  suggested—may	  
be	  a	  picture	  according	  to	  which	  you	  need	  only	  be	  a	  perceiver	  of	  God	  in	  order	  to	  be	  in	  position	  
to	  offer	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  theism—philosophers	  of	  God	  do	  not	  have	  the	  
monopoly	  here	  (even	  if	  they	  still	  have	  the	  monopoly	  on	  effective	  arguments).	  	  
	   At	  the	  very	  least	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  piqued	  the	  readers	  interest	  in	  the	  position	  that	  I	  have	  
tried	  to	  show	  may	  be	  available.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  a	  position	  that	  is	  little	  occupied	  in	  religious	  
epistemology	  today,	  if	  at	  all.	  Today	  those	  working	  in	  this	  area	  suggest	  that	  even	  if	  ordinary	  
theistic	  belief	  isn’t	  rationally	  supported	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  effective	  argument,	  it	  may	  still	  be	  
epistemically	  supported	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  produced	  by	  suitable	  proper	  functioning	  cognitive	  
faculties,	  or	  even	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  good	  evidence.	  None	  yet	  have	  ventured	  the	  thought	  that	  
even	  if	  one	  cannot	  offer	  a	  good	  argument	  for	  thinking	  that	  God	  exists,	  one	  may	  still	  be	  in	  
position	  to	  offer	  in	  one’s	  defense	  independent	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  so.	  That	  in	  any	  
case	  represents	  my	  plea	  for	  the	  theist	  in	  the	  street.	  Perhaps	  we	  should	  call	  it	  ‘Liberalism’	  in	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